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We study road supply by competing firms between a  single origin and destination.  In 
previous studies, firms simultaneously set their tolls and capacities while taking the actions of 
the others as given in a Nash fashion. Then, under some widely used technical assumptions, 
firms set the same volume/capacity ratio as a public operator would and thus have the same 
amount of congestion and travel time. We find that this result does not hold if capacity and 
toll setting are separate stages—as then firms want to limit the competition in the toll stage by 
setting lower capacities—or when firms set capacities one after the other in a Stackelberg 
fashion—as then firms want to limit their competitors’ capacities by setting higher capacities. 
In our Stackelberg competition, the firms that act last have few if any capacity decisions to 
influence. Hence, they are more concerned with the toll competition substage, and set a higher 
volume/capacity ratio than the public operator. The firms that act first care more about their 
competitors’  capacities  they  can  influence:  they  set  a  lower  ratio  and  have  the  largest 
capacities. The average volume/capacity ratio is below the public ratio, and hence the average 
private travel time is too short. Still, in our numerical model, for three or more firms, welfare 
is higher under Stackelberg competition than under Nash competition, because of the larger 
Stackelberg capacity expansion and lower tolls.  
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1. Introduction 
As government budgets become increasingly tight, it becomes ever harder for  them to 
finance road expansion in the face of ever growing congestion. This has sparked a rising 
interest  in private firms supplying road capacity instead of the government. Furthermore, 
there is a widespread view that private firms operate more efficiently because of their profit 
motive, thereby lowering the cost of capacity. Finally, private roads offer a way to introduce 
congestion-externality tolling in the face of strong public opposition to tolling of existing 
public roads. In Western Europe, about a third of the highway network is currently under 
concession  (Verhoef,  2007).  In  the  USA,  private  roads  and  express-lanes  are  becoming 
increasingly common; and also in developing countries private roads are increasingly popular. 
Yet, there are also disadvantages to private road supply. The private road invariably has 
marketpower: it is after all impossible to have an infinite number of private roads in parallel 
to ensure a perfectly competitive outcome. Hence, firms can set tolls and capacities that might 
be profit maximising but that are not socially optimal. An important question is how harmful 
for welfare is this and how does this change with the number of firms. 
The early literature looked at toll setting by a monopolist on a given road. Unless demand 
is perfectly elastic, the monopolist generally sets a higher toll than the public operator and 
consequently  has  less  congestion  and  shorter  travel  times  (see,  e.g.,  Buchanan  (1956), 
Mohring (1985), Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996), and de Palma and Lindsey (2000)). 
But this argument ignores capacity setting. Xiao, Yang and Han (2007) study private firms 2 
 
building  and  operating  parallel  roads  between  a  single  origin  and  destination.  Firms 
simultaneously determine capacity and tolls while taking the actions of the other as given: i.e. 
there is a single Nash-competition stage (also called an open-loop game in the literature). 
Now, firms set the same  volume/capacity ratio—i.e. a lower service quality—as a public 
operator, and hence have the same amount of congestion and travel time. Moreover, the ratio 
is independent of the actions of other firms and the number of firms. Thus, private supply 
does not lead to a distorted choice of the amount of congestion. Still, firms do set a higher 
tolls and lower capacities, and have fewer users. Wu, Yin and Yang (2011) find that the 
constant ratio result also holds in a general network. These results are conditional on there 
being neutral scale economies in road building and travel time being homogeneous to the 
degree zero in volume and capacity: i.e. if both the number of cars and capacity double, travel 
time remains the same, and travel time only depends on the volume/capacity ratio. 
The  crucial  assumption  behind  the  above  results  is  that  capacities  and  tolls  are  set 
simultaneously. De Borger and Van Dender (2006) have separate Nash-competition substages 
for capacity and toll (i.e. two-substages Nash or a closed-loop game). Now, firms set a lower 
capacity and higher ratio, as this lessens the toll competition and increases equilibrium tolls. 
Hence, private roads have more congestion and longer travel times than the first-best network. 
This is opposite to the result in the older literature that only looked at toll setting.  
Separate stages for capacity and toll seem more realistic as it takes a long time to build a 
road whereas the toll could be changed at any moment. However, this still assumes that all 
firms build their roads at the same time. This also seems unrealistic. Certainly, historically not 
all toll roads were build at the same moment. And if firms play a sequential capacity game, 
they will not take the actions of others as given and will not compete Nash in capacities.  
We introduce firms first setting their capacities sequentially in a Stackelberg fashion and 
then simultaneously setting their tolls in a Nash fashion. By setting a larger capacity, a firm 
can induce firms that follow to set lower capacities, which increases its marketpower and 
profit. Accordingly, the first few firms to enter set a higher capacity than they would without 
these strategic considerations, and this means that their volume/capacity ratios are lower than 
the public operator’s. The effect from De Borger and Van Dender (2006) that they want to set 
a  lower  ratio  to  lessen  the  toll  competition  still  occurs,  but  for  these  first  firms  this  is 
dominated by the capacity effect. The last few firms to enter have few if any competitors’ 
capacities to hinder. Hence, they care more about the toll substage and set a higher ratio. In 
our numerical model, with two firms, the first firm has a lower ratio than the public operator; 
the second has a higher ratio. With five firms, the first three firms have a higher ratio and the 
last two a lower. The net result is that the average volume/capacity ratio on the private roads 
is lower than in the public case, and hence average travel time is too short.  
Our analyses could also be applied on rail transport, airports, and seaports, but also non-
transport infrastructure such as waste disposal and telecommunication. For instance, there is 
an extensive literature on airlines competing in different market structures (see, e.g., Daniel 
(1995),  Breuckner  (2002),  and  Breuckner  and  Verhoef  (2010)).  Zhang  and  Zhang  (2006) 
study a monopolist airport’s choice of capacity and landing fare while its cariers have market 
power,  and  find  that  a  profit  maximiser  sets  a  lower  volume/capacity  ratio  than  socially 
optimal. Basso and Zhang (2007) extend this by having two airports competing single- or 
two-substages-Nash. Also in this setting our Stackelberg-capacity game could be used. 
 
2. Analitics 
2.1. Basic policies 
There are multiple roads connecting the single origin and destination that all have the same 
congestion  technology  and  free-flow  travel  time.  Generalised  travel  cost,  c
i,  of  link  i 
(henceforth referred to as cost for brevity) is homogeneous to the degree zero in the number 3 
 
of users, q
i, and capacity, s
i. Hence, cost and travel time only depend on the volume/capacity 
ratio q
i/s
i. The derivative of cost to the number of users is always positive, and to capacity it is 
always negative. These properties are, for example, met by the commonly used Bureau of 
Public  Roads  (BPR)  formulation.  Capacity  costs  are  proportional  to  capacity  and  follow 
             . Throughout the paper, we assume that demand is price sensitive and all roads 
congestible. We indicate total capacity by S, and total number of users by Q. 
We first discuss some basic policies that act as benchmarks for the oligopolistic cases. 
Since, most of these are basic, we generally keep the discussion short, for a more detailed 
discussions please see, for example, Verhoef and Small (2007). In the first-best (FB) case, 
the toll equals the congestion externality and capacity is set so that marginal cost of capacity 
expansion, k, equals the reduction in travel costs it causes: 
 
FB
Q cQ   ,   (1) 
S k c Q    .  (2) 
 
Here, subscripts indicate derivatives; superscripts indicate the situation or road. So, cQ is the 
derivative of travel cost to the number of users Q. 
If the initial capacity, s
0, remains untolled while the new public capacity, s
1, can be tolled, 
we are in the second-best (SB) situation. Now, the toll has a term that equals the externality 
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where DQ is the derivative of (inverse) demand to the total number of users. Conversely, the 
capacity setting basically follows the same rule as before—the cost of a marginal capacity 




s k c q     
(4) 
 
This means that the tolled road has the same volume/capacity ratio as the first-best network. 
But since there is also the untolled road, the ratio for the entire second-best network is higher.  
Also a single firm (SF) offering capacity in parallel to an untolled road uses capacity rule 
(4)  and  hence  has  the  same  volume/capacity  ratio  on  its  road.  But  its  toll  is  higher  as, 
following (5), the firm adds a positive mark-up to the congestion-externality charge,         , as 
long as demand is not perfectly elastic (i.e. −DQ =
 0) or the untolled road uncongestible (i.e. 
   
      .
2 The firm internalises the congestion externality as any reduction in congestion costs 
can be met by a  toll increase. The capacities  in the  single-firm and second-best cases are 
generally different: the higher private toll means that there are fewer users, which given that 
the ratio q
1/s
1 is same means that the capacity of the single firm is lower. If capacity costs 
were non-linear, the firm would generally set a different ratio than the public opperator. But 
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We also look at an untolled road with in parallel private firms in perfect competition. This 
                                                 
1 The second term is negative since DQ is negative while all other variables are positive. 
2 Conversely, in Knight (1924) and Edelson (1971), the firm does not add a mark-up because these authors assume    
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perfect  competition  (PC)  case  is  equivalent  to  welfare  maximisation  under  a  zero-profit 
constraint (see Verhoef (2008)). The corresponding lagrangian is 
 
     
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 [ ] [ ] [ ] .
Q PC P D n dn q c q c k s D Q c D Q c q k s                         
   
The first order conditions for toll and capacity are  
  
PC 1 1 1 / 0 ,
P q           (6a) 
11
PC 1 1 1 1 1 / 0 .
P
ss s q c k c k              (6b) 
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Thus, the volume/capacity ratio is again the same as with public pricing. Interestingly, the toll 





q cq   
(8) 
 
The intuition why follows the self-financing (i.e. zero-profit) result of Mohring and Harwitz 
(1962) with first-best pricing. Since, the volume/capacity ratio is the same as with first-best 
pricing, the first-best toll rule also leads to zero profit with perfect competition; and zero 
profit is what we need for perfect competition. Note also that with (8) the private toll equals 
the capacity cost per user.  Moreover, eq. (8) also implies  that the  level of the  perfectly-
competitive toll equals the first-best toll. The congestion externality is only a function of the 
volume/capacity ratio. Thus, if the first-best Q/S equals the perfectly competitive q
1/s
1, the 
tolls—which equal the externalities—will be the same.  
  If demand is price sensitive and the untolled capacity congestible, the perfectly competitive 
outcome has a higher toll than the second-best case, and thus there are fewer users on the 
private capacity and capacity is lower. Conversely, the competition means that the perfectly-
competitive toll is lower than the toll of the single firm. 
  Finally, we look at only capacity expansion (OCE) where the capacity is set welfare 
maximising but the road is untolled. This is good for the consumer as the expansion lowers 
travel costs while there is no toll to correct demand being too high as travel costs are partly 
external (i.e. the market failure of the congestion externality leads to demand being too high). 
But it is bad for the government as there is no toll revenue to  pay for the capacity. The 
capacity setting rule has a second-best correction that compensates for the remaining market 
failure. Still, the expansion does lower the deadweight loss from the externality by reducing 
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and the first-order conditions are 
 
 
OCE 1 / 0 , Q Q Q Q D c c Q D c             (10a) 
OCE 1 / 0 , SS s Q c k c            (10b) 




These conditions imply that the volume/capacity ratio following (11) is above the first-best 5 
 
ratio following (2), since the term in brackets is larger than 1 as cQ>0 and DQ<0. There will be 
more users relative to capacity to compensate for the externality that remains untolled. Still, 
total capacity might be higher than the first-best capacity (and is so in our numerical model), 
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2.2. Single-stage Nash 
In  all  oligopolistic  regimes,  the  initial  capacity  remains  toll  free  and  limits  the 
marketpower of the firms. Our first oligopolistic market structure is the single-stage Nash 
game from Xiao et al. (2007). Firms set their capacities and tolls simultaneously. If firms take 
the tolls and capacities of the others as given, they set the same volume/capacity ratio as the 
public operator. At this ratio, the capacity cost of a marginal capacity expansion equals the 
travel cost reduction on this link it causes. Any reduction in the travel costs can be met by an 
equal toll increase, so setting capacity at this level maximises profits. If the firm offered a 
higher capacity this would reduce travel costs and it could ask a higher toll, but then the extra 
revenue would be smaller than the extra capacity costs. Conversely, a lower capacity results 
in a capacity cost reduction that is below the revenue loss. Tolls are higher than with perfect 
competition as firms have marketpower, and this also means that total number of users and 
capacity  are  lower.  Yet,  as  DeVany  and  Saving  (1980)  and  Engel,  Fisher  and  Galetovic 
(2004) show for a given capacity, as the number of firms increases the Nash-equilibrium toll 
decreases and approaches the perfectly competitive outcome. Moreover, as the number of 
firms increases, capacity also approaches the perfectly-competitive outcome.   
  
2.3. Two-substages Nash 
In  the  two-substages  Nash  set-up  of  De  Borger  and  Van  Dender  (2006)  the  capacity 
setting precedes the toll setting, while in each substage firms take the actions of the others in 
that substage as given. Now firms have an incentive to set a lower capacity, as this lessens 
toll competition and increases Nash-equilibrium tolls: the lower your competitors’ capacities 
are, the higher the toll one can set due to the higher congestion on your competitors’ roads. 
This  alteration  of  the  capacity  setting  rule  means  that  firms  generally  set  a  higher 
volume/capacity ratio than the public operator.  
Using the formulas of De Borger and Van Dender (2006), we can write the capacity rule 
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where superscript 
* indicates that this toll is determined by the Nash toll-setting substage. All 
this assumes that the outcome is symmetric. De Borger and Van Dender (2006) find that, for 
their linear congestion technology and with very low marginal costs of capacity (0.25 or 
lower), an asymmetric equilibrium would result, which has slightly different characteristics. 
Still, even then, the volume/capacity ratio and tolls seems to be higher. With ―Bureau of 
Public Roads‖ power-of-four congestion, we have only encountered the symmetric outcome, 
even for a marginal cost as low as 0.05.
3 Therefore, we focus on the symmetric outcome.  
                                                 
3 An extra advantage of the symmetric outcome is that for De Borger and Van Dender (2006), it ensures that the response 
function of firm i’s capacity to firms j’s is always negative; with asymmetry this need not be so in a extreme and unlikely 
case. We assume that capacity costs are high enough to ensure downward-sloping capacity-response functions. In our 
numerical analyses we have only encountered such function, but our solution technique does not assume this. 6 
 
2.4. Stackelberg 
In our Stackelberg game, firms set their capacities one after the other. Then the toll setting 
substage follows in which tolls are set in a Nash fashion. The first firm to act is the leader and 
has the best position. With its capacity it can influence the capacity setting of all other firms 
and  the  results  of  the  toll  substage.  By  setting  a  higher  capacity,  the  leader  limits  the 
capacities of the other firms, thereby raising its marketpower and profit. Hence, again the 
capacity  setting  rule  is  different  than  in  the  fully  competitive  case,  and  the  leader’s 
volume/capacity ratio is below the public operator’s. Still, this extra capacity also has a profit 
lowering effect: given the actions of the others it would be profit maximising to set same ratio 
as the public operator. The optimal capacity is found when, for a marginal capacity increase, 
the  profit  increasing  effect  of  the  lower  capacities  of  the  competitors  equals  the  profit 
lowering effects from the too low volume/capacity ratio and lower Nash-equilibrium tolls. 
If  there  are  many  firms,  the  second  firm  to  act  also  has  an  incentive  to  set  a  lower 
volume/capacity ratio than is socially optimal. But its ratio will be above that of the first firm, 
as it has fewer firms to influence. The last firm to act has no capacities to influence. So it is 
only concerned with the toll setting substage. Just as in De Borger and Van Dender (2006), it 
sets a lower ratio to lessen the toll competition and raise the Nash-equilibrium tolls.  
Since the firms set different volume/capacity ratios, their travel times are different. The 
first  firm  has  the  shortest  travel  time.  But  since  the  sum  of  travel  cost  and  toll  (i.e.  the 
generalised price, or price for brevity) must be the same on all roads, this means that the first 
firm can ask the highest toll. The last firm has the longest travel time and lowest toll.  
 
2.5. Sequential entry 
 Our last oligopolistic market structure follows Verhoef (2008) and is sequential entry. 
This set-up is in between the two-substages-Nash and Stackelberg set-ups. There are again 
separate substages for capacity and toll. When the first firm enters, it first sets its capacity and 
then its toll given that it is the only firm. Since there are no other players to influence, it is 
profit maximising to have the same volume/capacity ratio as the public operator.  
Then, a second firm enters, and optimises its capacity given that there are two firms. The 
capacity of the first firm is fixed. In the following toll substage, firms set their tolls in a Nash 
fashion. So the first firm changes its toll, but not its capacity.
4 Each time there is a further 
entry, it follows the same pattern as for two firms. This set-up might seem a inconsistent in 
that firms are forward-looking to the  toll substage, but are continuously surprised when a 
further entry occurs (i.e. they are myopic to the  next  capacity stage). Yet, it also seems 
plausible that firms do not perfectly know what the future will bring and hence optimise given 
the current situation. Then a remark could be made against the Nash and Stackelberg games 
wherein firms have to known how many competitors there will be. 
 
3. Numerical model set-up 
We  focus  on  results  of  the  oligopolistic  market  structures  in  our  numerical  model,  the 
calibration  of  which  follows  Verhoef  (2007;  2008).  The  model  is  very  simple,  but  is 
calibrated to represent a congested peak-hour highway. User cost follows the BPR (Bureau of 
Public Roads) function, just as in most of the recent literature on private roads: 
 
4
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  (13) 
                                                 
4 This is not as restrictive as it seems. The first firm would like decrease its capacity, but this is not directly possible and 
would certainly not result in its recuperating all capacity costs. Hence, the best it can do is to keep its current capacity. 7 
 
Free-flow travel time, t
f, is an half an hour. Using a free-flow speed of 120 km/hour, this 
implies a trip length of 60 kilometres. The value of time, α, is 7.5. Units of capacity are set so 
that a traffic lane corresponds to a capacity of s
i=1500. Capacity costs follow              , 
where k equals 7. Since our unit of time is an hour, k is the hourly capacity cost. See Verhoef 
(2008, pp. 476-477) for the derivation from the average yearly capital cost of €5 million per 
lane-km or $8 million per lane-mile for freeways in the Netherlands. This cost seems in line 
with the estimates for the USA. Washington State Department of Tranport (2005) reports 15 
project from outside the state: median cost is about $8 million per lane-mile while a third is 
above $10 million. For the 21 project in the state, median cost is around $5 million per lane-
mile while a quarter is above $10 million. 
All roads have the same technology and free-flow travel time. Thus, a higher ratio q
i/s
i 
automatically implies a higher travel time.  The initial capacity in the base equilibrium  is 
s
0=1500. Inverse demand follows  
 
[ ] . D Q A B Q         (14) 
 
The A equals 61.27 and B 0.01167. This calibration results in a very congested road with 3500 
users and a travel time that is 5.4 times the free-flow travel time. If the initial situation was 
less congested, then the gain of private road supply as well as of public policies would be 
lower. In the base equilibrium, the price elasticity is −0.5; whereas in the perfect competition 
case, it is −0.21. In all other private settings it is in between these two extremes.   
 
4. Numerical results 
4.1. Basic policies and Nash capacity competition 
Table 1 describes the benchmark equilibria. It gives such things as consumer surplus and 
welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and system profit). It also gives the volume/capacity 
ratio on the entire network, on the untolled part, and tolled part. In the base equilibrium there 
is no tolling and capacity is 1500. In the first-best case, capacity is more than doubled and the 
toll equals the congestion externality. In the table, relative efficiency is the welfare gain of a 
policy from the initial base equilibrium relative to the first-best gain. 
  In the second-best case, the initial capacity s
0 remains untolled, but the extra capacity has 
a  welfare-maximising  toll.  Optimal  capacity  is  higher  than  in  the  first-best  case,  but  the 
volume/capacity  ratio  on  the tolled  part  is  the  same.  Due  to  the  low  initial  capacity,  the 
welfare gain of the second-best option is very close to the first-best gain. With more initial 
capacity the relative efficiency would be lower, since the capacity expansion would be less 
important while the detrimental effect of the larger untolled capacity would be larger.  
With only capacity expansion, the government optimises capacity but there is no toll. The 
welfare gain of is again close to the first-best gain. Still, this set-up makes a large loss, and the 
government  has  to  finance  this  from  other  sources  which  might  be  difficult.  The 
volume/capacity ratio is higher than in the first-best case, since the capacity rule now has a 
second-best correction. Still, total capacity is higher than in the FB case, as the absence of a 
toll means that there are more users. This lowers welfare since the marginal benefit for these 
users is below marginal social cost. Interestingly, in our numerical model, the ratio with only 
capacity expansion equals the one on the entire network in the second-best case, although 
there the ratio on the tolled part is lower and on the untolled part higher. 
A single firm building and tolling an extra road is also welfare improving. Private road 
supply  is  in  our  setting  always  welfare  improving:  the  firm  makes  a  profit;  whereas  the 
consumer is never worse off, since if users choose to use the private road it cannot have a 
higher price than the untolled road. Again, the private road has the same volume/capacity 
ratio as the first-best network. Still, the price and toll are higher, and capacity is lower. 8 
 
Table 1. Basic policies 
 
Base 
equilibrium  First-best  Second-best 
Only capacity 
expansion  Single Firm 
Perfect 
competition 
Relative efficiency  0  1  0.974  0.973  0.453  0.783 
Welfare  60984  109468  108206  108163  82946  98968 
Consumer surplus  71484  109468  133472  134390  90029  109468 
System profit  -10500  0  -25266  -26228  -7083  -10500 
Profit tolled part  -  0  -14766  -  3417.32  0 
Total capacity (S)  1500  3451.8  3734.0  3746.8  2078.5  2708.7 
Total demand (Q)  3500  4331.3  4782.7  4799.1  4331.3  3927.9 
Overall Q/S  2.333  1.255  1.281  1.281  1.890  1.599 
q
0/s
0 on untolled part  2.333  -  1.320    2.135  1.876 
q
1/s
1 on tolled part  -  1.255  1.255  -  1.255  1.255 
Price  20.42  11.16  5.46  5.26  15.43  10.72 
c
0 on untolled part  20.42  -  5.46  5.26  15.43  10.72 
c
1 on tolled part  -  5.14  5.14  -  5.14  5.14 
Toll  -  5.58  0.31  -  10.29  5.58 
 
Table 2. Single-stage Nash competition 
Number of firms  1  2  3  4  5 
Total capacity (S)  2078.5  2411.4  2521.4  2572.7  2602.0 
Total demand (Q)  3928.0  4150.5  4219.6  4250.9  4268.6 
Average toll  10.29  7.69  6.88  6.52  6.31 




 on the untolled part  2.135  2.005  1.959  1.937  1.924 
q
i/s
i on each private road  1.255  1.255  1.255  1.255  1.255 
Price  15.43  12.83  12.03  11.66  11.46 
Profit firm i  3417.3  1206.7  557.2  315.9  202.6 
Consumer surplus  90029  100518  103892  105440  106319 
Welfare  82946  92432  95064  96204  96832 
Relative efficiency  0.453  0.649  0.703  0.726  0.739 
Welfare  gain  relative  to 
perfect competition  0.578  0.828  0.897  0.927  0.944 
   
  The final case in Table 1 is perfect competition, which describes what happens when 
an infinite number of firms build capacity in parallel to the untolled capacity. This outcome is 
a useful benchmark for the oligopolistic regimes where firms have marketpower. Yet again 
the private operators have the same volume/capacity ratio as the public operator.  
  In the Single-stage Nash competition of Table 2 firms set their tolls and capacities at the 
same  time.  Since, the equilibrium is  symmetric  in  that all firms  have  the same  tolls  and 
capacities, we give the result for any firm i. Firms take the actions of the others a given. 
Hence, the best they can do is set the same volume/capacity ratio as the public operator (see 
Section 2.2). Note that in all oligopolistic setting the outcome with a single firm is the same. 
We only include it in the tables for comparison sake. 
As the number of firms increases, the single-stage Nash outcome approaches the perfectly 
competitive outcome. With a single firm, the welfare gain is 58% of with perfect competition; 
with two firms, it is already 83%; and with 5 firms, it is 94% percent.  
 
4.2 Two-substages Nash Competition 
Now we come to the first set-up where firms set their capacities strategically to influence 
the actions the others. These strategic considerations change the capacity setting rule, which 
means that firms generally have a different volume/capacity ratio than the public operator. As 9 
 
Table 3 shows, with two-substages Nash competition, firms have an incentive to set a lower 
capacity and higher ratio, because this increases the Nash-equilibrium tolls in the following 
toll-setting substage. However, this higher ratio comes at a cost: it raises travel time and this 
lowers the toll users are willing to pay. The optimal capacity is found where, for a marginal 
capacity increase, the profit enhancing effect of the higher willingness to pay a toll equals the 
detrimental effect of the lower tolls of the competitors.  
With two firms, the welfare gain of two-substages Nash competition is much lower than 
with a single stage, since capacity is much lower and tolls higher. Yet, as the number of firms 
increases the advantage for the firms of the separate setting of capacity and toll decreases, and 
the outcome approaches the single-stage-Nash and perfectly-competitive outcomes. 
 
Table 3. Two-substages Nash competition 
Number of firms  1  2  3  4  5 
Total capacity (S)  2078.5  2292.3  2404.4  2470.2  2513.1 
Total demand (Q)  3928.0  4087.1  4159.9  4200.0  4225.2 
Average toll  10.29  8.27  7.44  6.99  6.72 
Overall Q/S  1.890  1.966  1.815  1.747  1.710 
q
0/s
0  2.135  2.044  1.999  1.972  1.955 
q
i/s
i  1.255  1.288  1.285  1.280  1.277 
Price  15.43  13.57  12.72  12.26  11.96 
Profit firm i  3417.3  1449.6  772.1  474.1  319.2 
Consumer surplus  90029  97472  100971  102931  104170 
Welfare  82946  89871  92787  94328  95266 
Relative efficiency  0.453  0.596  0.656  0.688  0.707 
Welfare  gain  relative 
to perfect competition  0.578  0.760  0.837  0.878  0.903 
 
4.3. Sequential entry set-up 
The third oligopolistic market structure follows Verhoef (2008). Firms again have separate 
capacity and toll decisions. The difference is that now firms enter sequentially. First, firm 1 
enters, and sets its capacity and then its toll given that it is the only firm. Thereafter, a second 
firm enters and sets its profit maximising capacity given that there are two firms while taking 
into account how this affects the toll-setting substage. So the first firm’s capacity is fixed, as 
this is a long term decision; while its toll can be changed, as this is a short run decision. The 
entry pattern is the same for the third, fourth and so on entrants.  
As Table 4 shows, even though all firms have the same costs structures and congestion 
technologies, they are now ex-post asymmetric. This is due to the sequential decision making. 
The first firm sets a much higher capacity than it would under Nash competition, and this 
limits the capacities the others can set. Yet, this sequential decision making need not be good 
for the firms as becomes clear from comparing the profits in Fig. 1 with those in Table 3. For 
4 or more firms, firm 1’s profit is lower with sequential entry (Fig. 1) than with two-stage 
Nash (Table 3). Firm 2 always has a lower profit with sequential entry. Sequential entry leads 
to a much higher total capacity, and thus to stronger toll competition. For the up to 5 firms we 
study, sequential entry market gives a higher welfare gain than Nash competition. 
  As the number of firms increases, capacities increase and tolls decrease (see Fig 2), which 
leads to lower profits. Still, Firm 1 always attains the largest profit due to its largest size. The 






Table 4. Results under sequential entry 
Number of firms  1  2  3  4  5 
Total capacity (S)  2078.5  2399.1  2576.4  2670.3  2718.6 
Total demand (Q)  3928.0  4138.4  4237.3  4285.0  4308.4 
Average toll  10.29  7.86  6.80  6.30  6.05 
Overall Q/S  1.890  1.725  1.645  1.605  1.585 
q
0/s
0  2.135  2.012  1.946  1.912  1.894 
Capacity  firm 1 (s
1)  578.5  578.5  578.5  578.5  578.5 
Capacity  firm 2 (s
2)  -  320.5  320.5  320.5  320.5 
Capacity  firm 3 (s
3)  -  -  177.4  177.4  177.4 
Capacity  firm 4 (s
4)  -  -  -  93.8  93.8 
Capacity  firm 5 (s
5)  -  -  -  -  48.3 
Price  15.43  12.98  11.82  11.26  10.99 
Consumer surplus  90029  99931  104767  107138  108308 
Welfare  82946  91939  95687  97365  98153 
Relative efficiency  0.453  0.638  0.716  0.750  0.767 
Welfare  gain  relative  to 
perfect competition  0.578  0.814  0.910  0.953  0.973 
 
 
Fig. 1. Firm profit by the number of firms under sequential entry 
 
 
Fig. 2. The toll of each firm by the number of firms under sequential entry 
 
 
The sequential-entry market structure never reaches perfect competition. With 5 firms, 
total capacity is already above the perfectly-competitive level (see also Fig. 8 in Section 4.5), 
and the entries of the sixth and seventh firms only increases capacity (although these cases are 














































profitable. The reason is that, with five firms, a firm still has marketpower and adds a mark-
up to the toll (see Fig. 2); whereas with perfect competition, the toll equals the congestion 
externality and the mark-up is zero. At some point in the game there will be no further entry, 
as this would decrease marketpower so much that the entering firm would make a loss. Still, 
the welfare loss from this game never reaching perfect competition is limited. Two firms 
entering sequentially gives a consumer surplus that is 9% lower and welfare gain that is 19% 
lower than with prefect competition; for five firms these figures are respectively 1% and 3%.  
The most intriguing result from the sequential-entry market structure is the development of 
the volume/capacity ratios in Fig 3. When firm 1 enters, it sets the same ratio as the public 
operator since there are no other players to influence. Therefore, the best it can do is set its 
capacity so that the decrease in travel costs due to a marginal capacity expansion—which can 
be converted into toll payments—equals marginal capacity cost.  
When firm 2 enters, it sets a higher ratio, because this increases the Nash-equilibrium tolls 
in the toll-setting substage, thereby increasing its profit. So the second firm has a second-
mover advantage. This is the opposite from standard Stackelberg competition, where the firm 
that moves first has the advantage.
5 Because the  first capacity is fixed but the new entry 
attracts users away, the first firm’s volume/capacity ratio decreases and is now below the 
public ratio. The average ratio on the private roads also decreases, as firm 1 is larger. For later 
entries a similar pattern holds: the entrant sets a ratio above the public ratio to limit the toll 
competition, and the ratios of the incumbents and the overall ratio decrease.  
 
Fig. 3. Volume capacity ratio under sequential entry 
 
 
4.4. Stackelberg capacity competition 
Our last market structure extends the previous one by making firms forward looking: they 
recognise that their capacity influences the capacity setting of all following firms as well as 
the Nash toll-setting substage. The difference with the previous setting is that now firms know 
how many firms there will be, whereas before they assumed that they were the last entrant.  
As Table 5 and Fig. 4 show, with two firms, the leader sets a higher capacity and lower 
volume/capacity ratio than the follower. Still, the leader’s capacity is below the one with 
sequential entry, as this lower capacity lessens the toll competition, which raises profit even 
though it also raises the capacity of firm 2. The leader’s capacity is well above the single- or 
                                                 
5 There other cases where moving later gives an advantage. With incomplete information, actors that move later gain 
information from the actions that were taken. In common-value auctions the value of the item is the same for all bidders, 
but this value is unknown and each bidder has different information: e.g. when bidding for an oil field, bidders might have 
different geological estimates on the amount of oil. By gaining information from another bid, a bidder can update her 
beliefs and bid (Klemperer (2004)). With complete information, second-mover advantages also occur if firms compete in 































two-substages-Nash level, as this lowers the follower’s capacity and increases the leader’s 
marketpower. For three or more entrants the set-up and the results follow the same lines.  
 
Table 5. Results under Stackelberg capacity competition 
Number of firms  1  2  3  4  5 
Total capacity (S)  2078.5  2397.6  2564.2  2647.2  2686.6 
Total demand (Q)  3928.0  4137.8  4233.6  4279.0  4301.2 
Average toll  10.29  7.87  6.82  6.32  6.06 
Overall Q/S  1.890  1.726  1.651  1.616  1.601 
q
0/s
0  2.135  2.013  1.949  1.916  1.890 
Capacity  firm 1 (s
1)  578.5  576.2  543.4  489.7  428.3 
Capacity  firm 2 (s
2)  -  321.5  336.5  350.7  345.8 
Capacity  firm 3 (s
3)  -  -  184.3  201.0  226.5 
Capacity  firm 4 (s
4)  -  -  -  105.8  122. 
Capacity  firm 5 (s
5)  -  -  -  -  63.2 
Price  15.43  12.98  11.86  11.33  11.08 
Consumer surplus  90029  99902  104580  106837  107949 
Welfare  82946  91916  95558  97177  97943 
Relative efficiency  0.453  0.638  0.713  0.746  0.762 
Welfare gain relative to 
perfect competition  0.578  0.814  0.910  0.953  0.973 
 
Fig. 4. Volume capacity ratio on each road under Stackelberg capacity competition 
 
 




























































Fig. 6. Firm profit by the number of firms under Stackelberg competition 
 
 
Up to 4 firms, the volume/capacity ratio of firm 1 decreases with the number of firms. Yet, 
with 5 firms it is higher than with 4 firms. This suggest that as the number of firms increases 
even further, that the ratios of all firms approach the public ratio. With more firms, it is more 
difficult  to  influence  the  capacity  and  toll  setting  of  others  and  this  becomes  less  profit 
enhancing. Conversely, the profit loss from setting a lower ratio remains, in that the increased 
capacity costs are larger than the toll revenue gain due to the lower travel time; and for a 
higher ratio, the capacity cost reduction is offset by the larger loss in revenue. Only when it is 
possible to influence the actions of the others is it profit increasing to set a different ratio, but 
with  many  firms  the  strategic  effect  is  small.  This  suggests  that  our  Stackelberg  market 
structure also approaches perfect competition as the number of firms becomes large. So this is 
just as with standard Stackelberg competition. Certainly, as Figs. 5 and 6 indicate, the tolls 
and profits approach the perfectly-competitive outcome. 
 
Fig. 7. Weighted average volume/capacity ratio on the private roads 
 
 
4.5. Comparison of the oligopolistic market structures 
Fig. 7 compares the average volume/capacity ratio in the different oligopolistic settings. It 
also has the ratio with perfect competition as a benchmark, which equals the public one. The 
single-stage Nash market structure results in constant private volume/capacity ratios that also 
equal the public one. When the capacity and toll competitions are separate stages, firms set a 
higher  ratio  to  lessen  the  later  toll  competition.  Still,  this  ratio  seems  to  approach  the 
competitive level as the number of firms increase. Conversely, when firms set their capacities 
one after the other, the average ratio is below perfectly competitive one. For Stackelberg 
competition, the average seems to level off at five firms. And we expect, when number of 




































































competitive level. This because with more firms it becomes ever more difficult to influence 
your competitors’ capacities and tolls, and this makes strategic capacity setting less attractive.  
Sequential entry never reaches perfect competition because at some point capacity is so 
high that no further entry is profitable. Moreover, as Fig. 8 also shows, the capacity level with 
5 firms is already above with perfect competition, and further entry only increases capacity.  
Figs. 8 to 10 compare the capacities, average tolls, and relative efficiencies in the different 
market structures. All set-ups lead to substantial welfare gains that, even for 2 firms, are 
relatively  close  to  the  perfectly-competitive  level.  Only  with  a  single  firm  is  the  relative 
efficiency much lower with 0.453. Two-substages Nash attains of all oligopolies the lowest 
gain, as firms set a lower volume/capacity ratio, build less capacity, and have higher tolls.  
 
Fig. 8. Total capacity and the number of firms 
 
 
Fig. 9. Weighted average toll and the number of firms 
 
 

































































































The Stackelberg and sequential entry games have very similar results. A weakness of the 
Stackelberg model is that firms have to know how many firms there will be with certainty. 
Conversely,  with  sequential  entry,  firms  assume  that  they  are  the  last  entry  and  are 
continuously surprised when a further entry occurs. In reality the market structure might be in 
between these two games: i.e. a firm does not know for certain how many firms there will be, 
but has a prior belief about the likelihood of each outcome, and optimises given this belief. 
One would expect that this game would lead to an outcome in between our two set-ups. 
It is important to perform sensitivity analyses to important parameters. We focus on the 
effect of the amount of initial capacity. The effects of other such standard things as the price 
elasticity and value of time were as one would expect: e.g. more price sensitive demand 
makes private provision more beneficial as it limits market power. With more initial capacity, 
the  gain  of  the  first-best  policy  is  lower,  since  there  is  less  to  gain  from  the  capacity 
expansion.  For  the  second-best,  single-firm,  and  perfect-competition  cases  the  gain  and 
relative efficiency are also lower: capacity expansion is less important and there is  more 
initial capacity that remains untolled (see also Verhoef (2007)). The oligopolistic settings also 
attain lower gains; but compared with the perfect competition they fare better, because the 
larger untolled capacity limits the oligopolistic market power.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper re-examined whether a private firm sets the same volume/capacity ratio as a 
public operator and hence has the same travel time. Previous studies found that, under some 
technical assumptions, firms competing in parallel set the same ratio if they take the actions of 
the  others  as  given  in  a  Nash  fashion.  We  find  that  this  single-stage  Nash-competition 
assumption is crucial. If firms can influence the decisions of others with their capacity this 
changes their capacity-setting rule and they generally set a different ratio than the socially 
optimal one.  
In our Stackelberg market structure, firms first set their capacities one after the other and 
then set their tolls in a Nash fashion. Firms have two strategic considerations: (1) they want to 
limit the capacities of firms that follow by setting a higher capacity, and (2) they want to limit 
the toll competition by setting a lower capacity. The first firms to act have many capacities to 
influence and hence set a higher capacity and lower volume/capacity ratio than they otherwise 
would. The last firms have few if any capacities to influence and set a higher ratio.  
Strategic setting of a lower capacity to limit toll competition is harmful for welfare as it 
lowers  capacities  and  increases  tolls.  Stackelberg  setting  of  higher  capacities  to  limit 
competitors’ capacities can be good or bad for welfare: it increases the marketpower of the 
leaders,  but  also  tends  to  lead  to  higher  total  capacity  and  a  lower  average  toll.  The 
Stackelberg  oligopoly  seems  to  approach  perfect  competition  as  the  number  of  firms 
increases. In our numerical model, the Stackelberg game attains, with 2 firms, 81% of the 
perfectly-competitive gain, and with 5 firms this is 97%. A general result is that the effect of 
private road supply depends on the number of competitors and on the market structure: the 
outcomes are different in the single-stage Nash, two-substages Nash and Stackelberg set-ups.  
The reader might comment that our setting with many firms competing in parallel seems 
unrealistic, as it is rare to have many toll roads going to the same destination. However, as the 
number of toll road becomes ever larger—which seems likely—the chance that are multiple 
roads  going  roughly  in  the  same  direction  increases.  Moreover,  also  in  different  settings 
strategic  considerations  alter  the  capacity  setting  rule  and  lead  to  a  too  low  or  high 
volume/capacity ratios. Consider two firms competing in serial between a single origin and 
destination, with the first firm having a road on the first leg of the journey and the second on 
the second leg. A firm then might want to set a higher volume/capacity ratio, as this limits the 
demand for the first firm which would lower its toll. If a firm is a Stackelberg leader, it might 16 
 
want a higher ratio to induce the follower to set a higher capacity, which reduces travel cost 
and enables the leader to set a higher toll. If there are two destinations that are imperfect 
substitutes, then a firm wants a toll road to the competing destination to be smaller and its 
tolls  higher.  How  private  road  supply  fares  in  these  settings  and  in  more  general,  more 
realistic, networks seems a very interesting topic for further research. Similar structures are 
possinle for other congestible facilities  aswell: two airports could be perfect or imperfect 
substitutes or compete sequentially (i.e. the first airport is the destination of the second). 
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